Muzykalʹnai︠a︡ ėstetika i kulʹturologii︠a︡ -- Istorii︠a︡ muzyki -- Istorii︠a︡, teorii︠a︡ muzykalʹnogo ispolnitelʹstva -- Tradit︠s︡ionnai︠a︡ kulʹtura.

kn. 1. Muzykovedenie, filosofii͡a iskusstva -- kn. 2. Istorii͡a obrazovanii͡a, problemy pedagogiki -- kn. 3. Istorii͡a i teorii͡a muzyki, istorii͡a ispolnitelʹstava, Metodika i praktika professionalʹnogo obrazovanii͡a.

kn. 1. Muzykovedenie, filosofii͡a iskusstva -- kn. 2. Istorii͡a obrazovanii͡a, problemy pedagogiki -- kn. 3. Istorii͡a i teorii͡a muzyki, istorii͡a ispolnitelʹstava, Metodika i praktika professionalʹnogo obrazovanii͡a.

T. 1. Estestvennye i tochnye nauki obshchestvennye nauki -- t. 2. Tekhnicheskie i prikladnye nauki -- t. 3. Filialy.

The study of Kant’s anthropology, proposed by Viktor Kozlovskyi in its original and thorough monograph, is an entirely new interpretation of Kant’s answer to the fundamental question “What is man?”. On the basis of the philosopher’s heritage and taking into account the large body of research lit-erature, Kozlovskyi reconstructs five conceptual “human models” in Kant’s anthropological discourse. However, this study contains a number of problematic statements and conclusions. I argue first, that there is some inconsistency between Kant’s understanding of the (...) concept of “anthropology” and Ko-zlovskyi’s explanation. Second, the model of man as intelligible being, made explicit through the con-cepts of “freedom” and “spontaneity”, is a justified construction within the limits of criticism, but not quite correct with regard to the place and function of “anthropology” in it. Third, we can see a disso-nance between Kozlovskyi’s explanation of the constellations as “chronotopes-events” and interpreta-tion of this concept by Dieter Henrich’s school, where the methodology of “research constellations” was used to elucidate the early phase of German idealism. However, this leads to the cardinal question of how far this methodology is applicable for the analysis of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

Julian of Norwich emphasizes God’s eternal and unchanging love for humankind. Her visions show how God is not angry with our sins and so has no need to forgive us. God does not shame or blame us but excuses us and plans how to reward and compensate us for sin. In relation to Mother Jesus, we remain dear lovely children who need help, correction, and education. Although these remarks suggest to some that Julian must be soft on sin, that she (...) has no adequate appreciation of the worthiness of God or the dignity of human nature, I argue that this is far from the case. On the contrary, she makes Divine worthiness axiomatic and urges readers to live into it. She relocates human dignity not in its intrinsic value but in our centrality to God’s plan. She measures the seriousness of sin in terms of the real hard work it takes to rear us up out of it: crucifixion for Christ, the hell of being a sinner and the crucifixion of life-long penance for us. Nevertheless, the brightness of her visions dominates with her assurance that despite the sin-produced sufferings of this present life, all will be well. (shrink)

Versions of this paper have been read to philosophical colloquia at Occidental College and California State University, Fullerton. I am indebted to participants in those discussions, to students in many of my classes, and particularly to Marilyn McCord Adams, Van Harvey, Thomas Kselman, William Laserow, and James Muyskens, for helpful comment on the ideas which are contained in this paper (or which would have been, had it not been for their criticisms).

L'analisi dell'aristotelismo «platonizzante» nell'ambito della filosofia araba prima della sistemazione della Shifa di Avicenna, secondo cui Dio non avrebbe conoscenza dei particolari, consente all'A. di dimostrare come ci siano stati anche approcci platonici ad Aristotele , che non sono passati attraverso il filtro dei neoplatonici greci. L'altra cosa significativa è il fatto che all'interno della scuola di Baghdad vi sono modi diversi di intendere lo stato ontologico degli universali. L'A. tenta anche di ridimensionare la figura di al-Farabi all'interno della scuola (...) di Baghdad. I filosofi considerati sono al-Farabi, Yahya b. Adi e Ibn al-Tayyib. (shrink)

Reasoned disagreement is a pervasive feature of public life, and the persistence of disagreement is sometimes troublesome, reflecting the need to make difficult decisions. Fogelin suggests that parties to a deep disagreement should abandon reason and switch to non-rational persuasion. But how are the parties to know when to make such a switch? I argue that Fogelin's analysis doesn't clearly address this question, and that disputes arising in areas like medical decision making are such that the parties to them have (...) reasons to act as if they can be rationally resolved even if they are deep. Fogelin's analysis is thus of limited value as regards the practical moral demand of addressing concrete moral dilemmas. (shrink)

In this interesting and stimulating collection, Mark Rothstein has brought together authors from a number of different disciplines to explore some of the issues surrounding pharmacogenomics: the use of genetic testing to design new drugs, and to prescribe more effectively the drugs we already have. Pharmacogenomics is an area of fevered speculation on the part of biotechnology firms and large pharmaceutical companies. Their hope is that by targeting drugs at specific populations, industry will be able to develop new products more (...) quickly, more cheaply, and with less risk of marketing something that actually kills the patient. An often cited study by Lazarou, Pomeranz, and Corey suggests that adverse drugs reactions are between the fourth and the sixth biggest causes of death in US hospitals.1As someone very familiar with the scientific and ethical literature on pharmacogenomics, I did find that a number of chapters in this collection simply rehearsed arguments that have been made elsewhere, sometimes by the same authors. Rather than seeing these as “fillers”, however, I think it is better to regard them as providing a sound introduction to the current state of …. (shrink)

The notion of authenticity, i.e., being “genuine,” “real,” or “true to oneself,” is sometimes held as critical to a person’s autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that authenticity is difficult to observe in others. Therefore, judgments of inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic interventions, among other things. This article delineates what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to (...) live according to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity. The article contributes to a tradition of thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings. (shrink)